http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/x/


11. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carter)/1/

Washington, February 10, 1964.

/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, DCI McCone
Memoranda, 01 March 1962-30 April 1965, Box 9. Secret.

Two subjects on which we must reach an agreed policy decision are (a)
the surfacing of the Ox and (b) the management of NRO.

With reference to the former, I reviewed the "visibility" of the Ox on
Friday./2/ I find that Drs. Wheelon and Maxey/3/ are agreed that the
improved Soviet radar capability makes the Ox visible both to the long
range search radar and the radars associated with the surface-to-air
missile systems. Therefore it is impossible to fly the Ox over Soviet
territory without detection. Originally it was thought--and as
recently as 18 months ago--that the Soviet radar would not pick up the
Ox. The findings of Dr. Wheelon disprove this and this fact bears
heavily on the future use of the Ox.

/2/February 7.

/3/Albert D. (Bud) Wheelon, Deputy Director for Science and
Technology, Central Intelligence Agency. Jackson Maxey, Chief of the
Special Projects Staff, Central Intelligence Agency.

If the decision is made by higher authority not to use the Ox for the
purposes originally planned--i.e., clandestine surveillance of the
Soviet Union--then it must be considered as a "quick reaction"
surveillance asset to be used in times of danger, under circumstances
of heightened tension, with the full appreciation of the risks and the
provocations.

This raises the question of whether in its reconnaissance
configuration it should continue as a CIA asset or be turned over to
the Air Force. This question must be examined carefully and, quite
naturally, the use of the Oxcart over non-Soviet denied territory such
as Communist China, Southeast Asia and even Cuba should be taken into
consideration.

The above problem is one of the important questions associated with
surfacing the Ox--probably/4/ the most important long term question
from the standpoint of CIA, our budget, etc.

/4/The word "probably" is inserted by hand, and the words "but is not"
are crossed out.

I feel it must at some time be surfaced because of the military
versions. Also we are sure to have an accident or forced landing at a
public airport, or a "leak", which will have the effect of surfacing.
Timing is of importance as well as method, and these should be studied
and an in-house decision reached for guidance in talking with the
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Director, NRO and higher
authority.

[NRO material snipped]