| Subject: Re: Guardian: US report on run-up to 9/11 damns intelligence |
| From: Sir Arthur C. B. E. Wholeflaffers A.S.A. |
| Date: 25/07/2003, 08:26 |
| Newsgroups: alt.alien.visitors,alt.alien.research,alt.paranet.ufo,alt.paranet.abduct |
In article <bfq32e$le1$1@pencil.math.missouri.edu>, MichaelP says...
http://www.guardian.co.uk/alqaida/story/0,12469,1005413,00.html
The Guardian Friday July 25, 2003
Ewen MacAskill, diplomatic editor
The US national security agency picked up "communications that indicated
possible impending terrorist activity" between September 8 and September
10 2001 but failed to act on them, according to a congressional
investigation into the al-Qaida attacks on New York and Washington.
The long-awaited 900-page report, which was released late yesterday,
criticised the NSA, the CIA and the FBI for a series of intelligence
failures that could have prevented the September 11 attacks.
The report also confirms there was no link between al-Qaida and the Iraqi
regime led by Saddam Hussein, despite claims to the contrary by President
George Bush in the runup to war with Iraq.
The investigation into intelligence failures began in February 2002 and
was completed in December. Publication has been delayed until now because
of internal rows over how much of it could be declassified. All but 28
pages are being released to the public.
Excerpts from the report, released in advance, said the NSA, which is
responsible for covert intercepts, had failed to translate the
conversations in the run-up to the attacks so was not in a position to
disseminate the information.
The report says: "Prior to Sept 11, the intelligence community was not
prepared to handle the challenge it faced in translating the volumes of
foreign language counterterrorism intelligence it collected ... The
intelligence community's ability to produce significant and timely signals
intelligence on counterterrorism was limited by the [NSA's] failure to
address modern communications technology aggressively ... and insufficient
collaboration between NSA and FBI regarding the potential for terrorist
attacks in the United States."
The NSA intercepted conversations in early 1999 linking two of the
hijackers - Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazm, who were on the plane
that crashed into the Pentagon - to al-Qaida but failed to pass that
information to other intelligence agencies, including the FBI, which had
an agent with access to them in San Diego who might have been able to
learn more.
"As a result, the FBI missed the opportunity to task a uniquely
well-positioned informant - who denies having any advance knowledge of the
plot - to collect information about the hijackers and their plans," the
report says.
The report also criticises the CIA, which expected attacks by al-Qaida on
US embassies and interests abroad but not on America itself. In the 10
years leading up to the attacks, the CIA had been relying too much on
communication intercepts rather than placing agents on the ground.
"The intelligence community did not effectively develop and use human
sources to penetrate al-Qaida's inner circle," the report says. "This lack
of reliable and knowledgeable human sources significantly limited the
community's ability to acquire intelligence that could be acted upon
before the Sept 11 attacks."
The report notes that while information had been available since 1994 that
terrorists might use planes, "none the less, testimony and interviews
confirm that it was the general view of the intelligence community ...
that the threatened Bin Laden attacks would most likely occur against US
interests overseas".
It adds: "The CIA's failure to watchlist suspected terrorists aggressively
reflected a lack of emphasis on a process designed to protect the
homeland."
The Pentagon cited this lack of intelligence as a reason for not mounting
substantial attacks on al-Qaida in Afghanistan. Under President Clinton
the US launched cruise missiles against suspected al-Qaida camps: while
safe for the US military, the strikes proved ineffective against al-Qaida.
The report is also critical of the failures of the FBI, which "was unable
to identify and monitor effectively the extent of activity by al-Qaida and
other international terrorist groups operating in the United States."