Could the idea in the following article work?
..
The following describes a system that does an end run around the
stranglehold government has on the vote count. It establishes that
the vote has always "been riggable, if not rigged", and that the
reason we've never been able to vote the bastards out, is because
we have never actually voted the bastards in. It describes a simple,
inexpensive system by which 3-6 people can take a "verified" 10%
sample of the voting block of a city of a quarter of a million
people, in 10 days working 8 hours a day. With that, the voters
will control the electorate, not the vote riggers. You can surely
and successfully take back your government without protests, marches,
committees, rummage sales or even very much effort.
VoteScam--Breakthrough--Parallel Systems By: mac Sperry
Email:imagineering400@yahoo.com Note: This article is the second
in a series on this website and should be considered in context
with the original entitled: Stealing the Vote--Urgent--Drop All
Else. It can be found at:
http://indymedia.org/front.php3?article_id=343694
..
When failure is not an option and absolute reliability is required,
systems are designed in parallel to add redundancy and backup.
Consider the modern airliner with multiple engines, or the automobile
with dual headlights and taillights. Parallel systems are everywhere,
though we often don't notice them. This is especially true in nature;
two eyes, two ears, two arms, two kidneys, two testicles, two
ovaries, two thumbs and eight fingers.
Parallel systems are standard in business. The common bank check,
"checks" the monetary details of a transaction. If the check is
issued to a bank, then other systems are also used to verify the
check. They are: the receipt at the time of transaction, then later
the statement that verifies the receipt in addition to the check.
In fact, it's hard to imagine any official transaction between
business, customer, government or citizen in which the details are
not alternately verified. However, there is one notable exception
to this, it is the vote. The vote hasn't been alternately verified
since voting began. Did someone forget? Was it never mentioned? Has
it all been just a big mistake? An oversight? That any form of
alternate vote check system has not been instituted in over 200
years of election history, constitutes compelling evidence that the
vote has always been at least riggable, if not rigged.
To be fair and complete, there have been two other parallel systems
that have been used to superficially verify the voting "transaction"
between citizen and government. They are the telephone survey and
the exit poll. Both have traditionally been conducted by news
organizations. Their methods and veracity have however come under
question lately with revelations of widespread, long term vote
tampering that surfaced in the 2000 elections. These events make
it hard to believe that the media hasn't known all along.
The following proposes a novel parallel system for the purpose of
checking vote count accuracy. The system would operate outside
government or political parties. It would be operated by ordinary
citizens who would come together in ad hoc fashion for only one
purpose, to verify the integrity of the vote. The system has been
named V.O.T.E. It is an acronym for: Verifier for Objectively Testing
Elections, or "Verifier" for short.
Verifier would work this way. Three to six "samplers", each registered
for different political parties but not actively involved in their
party, would set up a folding table and chairs on a public street
corner adjacent to a US Post Office mailbox. This would be done
every day for ten days before the election. Samplers would each be
equipped with a digital camera of the type that takes hi megabyte
digital storage cards. A voter would simply walk up and place their
previously punched absentee voter card on the table, along with
their addressed and stamped envelope.* Each sampler would verify
the number on the ballot by writing it down on a list, then take a
picture of the ballot and envelope, touching neither. They would
then ask the voter to place the ballot in the envelope, seal it and
drop it into the mailbox as the three watch.
Each sampler would then take their "records" home and put them in
a safe place until the night of the election. On that night each
would meet at a predetermined place along with other samplers like
themselves, and other volunteer "counters" and "observers". Samplers
and observers would be arbitrarily assigned to counters who would
count the vote under the watchful eyes of observers. The sampler
at this point would only be there to answer questions counters or
observers might have on the work of the sampler. The entire operation
would be video-audio taped as a record of the event.
After the polls close each picture taken would be called up on
computers. Ballot numbers would first be verified, then the vote
would be counted and tabulated. Certainly there will be ways to
speed up the process, but none that would in any way jeopardize the
integrity of the count. The final count would then be compared to
the count provided by the registrar of voters. Each count would
check the other.
As long as they agree all is fine. Major disagreement would raise
flags.
While the vote tabulated by volunteers would not have official
standing, the circumstances under which it was acquired, its verified
certainty as to the actual vote cast and the statistically high
sample should enable predictions closer than one percentage point.
Statistical certainty of this magnitude should constitute Prima
Facie evidence in a court of law, not to mention the court of public
opinion. Remember, exit polls accurately predicted to within a few
percentage points most elections for the last four decades, even
though their samples were statistically very small and the vote was
uncorroborated, except for the word of the interviewed and the
interviewer. Only after the 2000 elections, in which touch-screen
electronic voting was introduced, were exit polls suddenly ended.
This was ostensibly due to their sudden failure to do the job they
had done well for decades. Some of these elections are now being
legally challenged.
The advantages of Verifier are:
1) It is an efficient system in which only 3-6 people are required
to easily take a 10% sample of voters in a city of a quarter million
people.** All this for an expenditure of 8 hours a day, for ten
days before the election. Note: The actual percentage required to
achieve a mathematical certainty of plus or minus 1% may require a
sample of less than 10%.
2) It does not require permission or license from government and
can be initiated and conducted by individuals with the will.
3) Results are objectively verified and recorded eliminating
substantiation problems prevalent in telephone surveys and exit
polls, yet still maintains voter anonymity.
4) Multiple samples can be taken simultaneously by different groups
of different origin up to the entire voting block (100%), each thus
checking the other as well as the government count.
5) Dollar cost is quite low and equipment can be reused in future
elections.
Exit polls, telephone surveys or any other system that might be
devised, could be conducted in parallel. This would serve to further
corroborate both Verifier and the registrars count. If implemented
with integrity all results should be the same.
Government has a compelling interest in the prevention of "vote
buying". This is ostensibly prevented by making the viewing of
another voters ballot a crime. But the public also has a compelling
interest, an overriding interest in seeing to it that the vote count
is beyond question. The idea that a sampler might not be able to
photograph a voters ballot to prevent vote buying is preposterous.
A sampler would have to be a mental defective to attempt something
like that in front of other samplers, of other parties.
Still, there will be arguments made that Verifier may destroy the
secrecy of the vote. Don't fall for them. It is reasonable that
past laws preventing a voter from showing their ballot to another
were instituted primarily to provide a plausible rationale to stop
the introduction of systems similar to Verifier. Surely someone
must have thought of similar things in the past. Verifier maintains
the secrecy of the vote. A voters identity and their ballot are
never associated.
If necessary, "blinders" could be built into the table/equipment
used by samplers so that the voters face is never seen.
There will be calls for government to run elections exclusively,
including verification. Checking the vote count should not be the
exclusive domain of government, as government checking its own count
is an obvious conflict of interest. However, there is good reason
to expect government to pay for the implementation and operation
of parallel systems that might be used to alternately check
government's count.
Finally, I'm sure I don't have to tell you, without the vote we are
doomed and there will probably be no way back. Even revolution,
considering the weapons the government probably has, is probably
out.
Therefore, this is our last stand.
* A further refinement that might be considered is a simple apparatus
into which a voter's voter registration card might be inserted. The
apparatus would allow the card to be photographed together with the
ballot. The apparatus would cover the name of the voter thus
maintaining voter anonymity. However, it would allow the voters
party affiliation to be viewed and photographed. With that information
smaller samples might be required due to a reduction in the possibility
of partisan, regional, ethnic skewing of the sample. A large sample
of 50% or more might eliminate any need for this.
** Sample numbers presented above are quite realistic if one considers
that in a city of 250,000 typically only half are registered to
vote.
Of those registered only 40% actually vote. That's 50,000 actual
voters. A 10% sample of 50,000 is 5,000 voters, or 500 a day for
the 10 days before the election. 500 divided by an eight-hour day
is approximately 60 an hour, at a reasonable rate of one ballot per
minute. Those same 3-6 samplers could take a 100% sample of a city
of 25,000 using the same resources and time.
mac Sperry is a writer living in San Diego.
c. 2003 All copyrights are relinquished to the public domain if
republished in its entirety.
Please distribute widely. There isn't much time before the 2004
election. People ask; "but what can I do?" This is it. Communicate
this as far and wide as you can and get busy. It's a race from here
on out. If we win, we win a beautiful world with a beautiful future.
And if we lose? There's no need to talk about it because we're gonna
win.
Visit: www.howtofixtheworld.org mac