In article <i7b2vvcj1j9f4d4c2kh73esvuo3po5jsvi@4ax.com>, no name says...

On Tue, 30 Dec 2003 07:43:41 GMT, Sir Arthur C.B.E. Wholeflaffers �.S.�.
<nospam@newsranger.com> wrote:
[...]

If you have REAL information about Wise
please share it with the rest of humanity.

He's a nice guy.  A very kind gentle human being.

Wrong, and you are a spOOk also.
I do seem to be able to flush out the spOOks!!!

Lost History: Project X, Drugs & Death Squads

By Robert Parry 

WASHINGTON -- "The C.I.A. Cleanses Itself," declared a mostly upbeat lead
editorial in The New York Times on March 4. The U.S. spy agency had severed its
ties to about 100 foreign agents who were "killers, torturers, terrorists and
other assorted miscreants," the editorial observed with satisfaction: 

"The Central Intelligence Agency's purge of foreign agents with criminal
histories is an
important milestone in the organization's effort to discard the bad habits of
the Cold War." 

Two days later, a front-page story in The Washington Post described the
Pentagon's release of long-withheld documents that described how, for decades,
the U.S. Army had been training soldiers around the world in techniques of
blackmail, kidnapping, murder and spying on non-violent political opponents.
That mysterious training program went by the spooky code name "Project X." 

A day after that, a federal grand jury in Miami returned a narcotics indictment
against Joseph Michel Francois, the military police chief who had led the coup
in Haiti which ousted elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991. Francois
and his military allies held power for the next three years, while Francois ran
a U.S.-trained counter-narcotics unit that managed to arrest fewer and fewer
drug traffickers. 

Meanwhile, in Washington, senior national security officials mocked Aristide's
repeated charge that the military government was deeply implicated in drug
trafficking. And when President Clinton pressed to restore Aristide to power in
1993, the CIA undercut that strategy by sending a classified report to Congress
that portrayed the exiled president as a psychopath. With its well-placed allies
in Washington, Haiti's military government held on for another year before
Clinton finally ordered an invasion that ousted Francois and Haiti's generals. 

The indictment in Miami accuses Francois of collaborating with Colombian drug
cartels to
smuggle 33 tons of cocaine and heroin into the United States over a nine-year
period. The Francois indictment came only two months after the indictment of
another U.S. "counter-narcotics" ally, Venezuelan Gen. Ramon Guillen Davillaver.
[See The Consortium, March 17, 1997] 

This string of stories, tumbling out one on top of another, left a troubling
image of an American foreign policy that had collaborated with a very foul cast
of criminals. But it was
equally troubling that these remarkable admissions had an ephemeral
one-day-story quality about them. They had almost no "bounce" onto the talk
shows, the op-ed pages and the
evening news. 

While the Washington press corps continued to obsess over every detail of the
scandal du jour-- political fund-raising -- the U.S. government's admission that
it had acted as something akin to an international terrorist state and had
protected drug dealers just didn't make the grade. 

Questions Unasked

But the cumulative stories amounted to official acknowledgement that the United
States had put a large number of criminals on the CIA payroll and counseled
Third World militaries in grisly "death squad" tactics. The new evidence
established that, to a disturbing degree, the bloody mayhem in the Third World
meshed with a worldwide American counter-insurgency strategy.  Indeed, the
United States may have supplied, in Project X, one of the key blueprints for the
mass anti-communist slaughters that have claimed hundreds of thousands of
civilian lives, from Asia to Latin America. 

Still, in the days that followed the government's admissions, the Washington
press corps
didn't ask the obvious questions: Who were the CIA's murderous agents? What
crimes had
they committed? Which U.S. officials were responsible? How many other dirty
operatives had been on the CIA's employment rolls in earlier eras? Hundreds
more? Thousands? How many of these operatives were implicated in smuggling drugs
into the United States? And how many murderers and criminals were retained on
the payroll because their information was considered vital to national security?


What little press attention there was to the CIA "cleansing" mostly spun in the
same positive direction as the Times editorial: The CIA's admission had been a
courageous purgative that merited credit, more than questions, reflection and
condemnation. 

There was little criticism, either, of the Pentagon's partial release of
documents from Project X, the worldwide counter-insurgency training program. As
The Consortium reported in the Oct. 14, 1996, issue, the full story of Project X
might remain cloaked in secrecy for all time because of an apparently illegal
destruction of the most embarrassing documents. 

In 1992, in the last year of the Bush administration, Defense Secretary Dick
Cheney ordered all copies of the most objectionable sections of Project X
destroyed. The ostensible reason was to prevent them ever being copied and
taught again. But a more plausible explanation was to keep the details out of
the hands of historians. 

The National Archives has begun an investigation to see if the document
destruction media about a government cover-up. Cheney was not swamped with
interview requests. Senators did not make headlines demanding congressional
hearings. Longtime CIA critics were not consulted as talking heads on television
news shows. 

Bad Old Days

To Noam Chomsky, an MIT professor and one of those critical voices, the media's
handling of the admissions was no big surprise. "We can say that was the Cold
War, the bad old days,"  Chomsky told The Consortium. "But it was not the Cold
War. The Russians were no where in Latin America." 

Chomsky also sees the same violent counter-insurgency strategies continuing into
the
post-Cold War period, especially in Colombia where a vicious drug war has
replaced
anti-communism as the rationale for the killing. "Even the State Department
reports concede
that two-thirds of the killings -- about 10 a day -- can be traced to the
government troops and the paramilitary," Chomsky noted. 

Edward Herman, another prominent critic of national security abuses, also saw
the tepid media response as par for the course. "They tend to feature these CIA
admissions in the context of these things being allegedly ended," Herman said in
an interview. "These belated admissions... make us the good guys again. We see
the error of our ways and we're now on a new course." 

But Herman added that these recent semi-mea-culpas do not stop the United States
from
continuing relationships with prominent mass murderers, such as Indonesia's
President
Suharto and the communist Chinese leadership. "We've moved to a higher plane,"
Herman
said. "Now we're dealing with the wholesale terrorists." 

Project X took shape in the 1960s amid the excitement that President John
Kennedy brought to the concepts of counter-insurgency warfare, by mixing
"hearts-and-minds" civic projects and Green Beret esprit de corps with ruthless
suppression of leftist uprisings demanding basic social, political and economic
changes. 

As early as 1962, Kennedy dispatched Army Gen. William P. Yarborough from Fort
Bragg to South America. There, he urged Colombia to mount "paramilitary,
sabotage and/or terrorist activities against ... communist proponents,"
according to Pentagon records. 

The anything-goes mentality pervaded U.S. strategy throughout the world, but it
resonated
with special intensity in America's "back yard" of Central and South America. In
a Los
Angeles Times article [March 18, 1982], Charles Maechling, who oversaw the U.S.
counter-insurgency strategies from 1961-66, despaired over the devastating
effects of those
policies on Latin America. In the 1960s, Maechling said, the United States
shifted from a
policy of tolerance of "the rapacity and cruelty of the Latin American military"
to "direct
complicity" in "the methods of Heinrich Himmler's extermination squads." [Quotes
often cited by Chomsky] 

Birth of Project X

Though the counter-insurgency strategies took shape in the 1950s and early
1960s, the U.S. intelligence community moved to formalize those lessons in 1965
by commissioning Project X.  Based at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and
School at Fort Holabird, Maryland, the project was tasked with the development
of lesson plans which would "provide intelligence training to friendly foreign
countries," according to a brief history, which was prepared in 1991. 

Called "a guide for the conduct of clandestine operations," Project X "was first
used by the
U.S. Intelligence School on Okinawa to train Vietnamese and, presumably, other
foreign
nationals," the history stated. 

Linda Matthews of the Pentagon's Counterintelligence Division recalled that in
1967-68, some of the Project X training material was prepared by officers
connected to the so-called Phoenix program in Vietnam, an operation that
included assassination of suspected communists. "She suggested the possibility
that some offending material from the Phoenix program may have found its way
into the Project X materials at that time," according to the Pentagon report. 

In the 1970s, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School moved to Fort
Huachuca in
Arizona and began exporting Project X material to U.S. military assistance
groups working
with "friendly foreign countries." By the mid-1970s, the Project X material was
going to
military forces all over the world. 

In 1982, the Pentagon's Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
ordered the Fort Huachuca center to supply lesson plans to the School of the
Americas at Fort Benning, Ga.  "The working group decided to use Project X
material because it had previously been cleared for foreign disclosure," the
Pentagon history stated. 

According to surviving documents released under a Freedom of Information Act
request, the Project X lessons contained a full range of intelligence
activities. A 1972 listing of Project X lesson plans covered aerial
surveillance, electronic eavesdropping, interrogation,
counter-sabotage measures, counter-intelligence, handling of informants,
break-ins and
censorship. 

One manual warned that insurgents might even "resort to subversion of the
government by
means of elections [in which] insurgent leaders participate in political
contests as candidates for government office." Citizens were put on "'black,
gray or white lists' for the purpose of identifying and prioritizing adversary
targets." The lessons suggested, too, creation of
block-by-block inventories of families and their assets to keep tabs on the
population. 

The Investigation

The internal review of Project X began in 1991 when the Pentagon discovered that
the
Spanish-language manuals were advising Latin American trainees on
assassinations, tortureand other "objectionable" counter-insurgency techniques.
The manuals suggested coercive methods for recruiting counter-intelligence
operatives, including arresting the target's parents or beating him until he
agreed to infiltrate a guerrilla organization. To undermine guerrilla forces,
the training manuals countenanced "executions" and operations "to eliminate a
potential rival among the guerrillas." 

According to another passage, sodiopentathol -- "could be used under certain
extenuating
circumstances. ...It could be intravenously injected and would have results of a
truth serum."  The U.S. training manuals declared as "essential" the penetration
of political parties that might sympathize with or support a guerrilla movement.
Targets, whether "hostile or not," should be put under surveillance and
subjected to "ways to diminish [their] influence and image," another passage
stated. "Some examples of these targets are governmental officials, political
leaders and members of the infrastructure." 

By summer 1991, Cheney's office had ordered all relevant material collected.
Then, Werner E. Michel, the intelligence oversight assistant to the defense
secretary, recommended that one copy of the seven manuals be retained for record
purposes. But Michel then added, "all other copies of the manuals and associated
instructional materials, including computer disks, lesson plans and 'Project X'
documents, should be destroyed." 

The recommendation received approval from senior Pentagon officials. Some of the
more
innocuous Project X lesson plans were spared. But those Project X manuals that
dealt with the sensitive human rights violations were destroyed in 1992, the
Pentagon reported. 

The full history might have been lost in the shredder. 

(c) Copyright 1997 

As are many of the Usenet operatives who are being paid to post here.

But that does not preclude the need to really understand for whom they work
-- it's the power elite -- the same people who rammed the Pentagon and the
World Trade towers.  

The US government is being used by the power elite.

You folks have got to wake up and smell the coffee.  The very best thing you
can do is to tell Ruppert what you know about the extraterrestrial cover up.

If you don't blow the whistle on the ET secret keeping, then all is lost.

And I mean that sincerely.