In article <c05ut9$1vec$1@pencil.math.missouri.edu>, Mark Graffis says...

February 7, 2004
NY TIMES

Engineer's Papers Dispute Hubble Decision
By DENNIS OVERBYE

NASA's decision to abandon its crown scientific jewel, the Hubble Space
Telescope, cannot be justified on safety grounds, according to a pair of
reports by a NASA engineer that have been circulating in scientific and
political circles in the last few days.

The unsigned documents are attracting attention on Capitol Hill, particularly
in the House Science Committee, which is expected to discuss the Hubble
decision at a meeting on Thursday.

"We're reviewing the Hubble decision, looking at it very closely," said a
spokesman for Representative Sherwood Boehlert, Republican of New York and
chairman of the committee. "We're going to be examining the views in this
particular document as well as a whole host of others."

The documents have also created a buzz among astronomers, who hope that their
wider distribution will help spark a larger debate about the telescope's fate.
The reports have deepened astronomers' skepticism that safety and not politics
and money was the issue last month when Sean O'Keefe, the NASA administrator,
announced the cancellation of the space shuttle's planned 2006 maintenance
visit to the telescope. As a result, the telescope will probably die in orbit
within three years, astronomers say, instead of lasting into the early part of
the next decade as originally planned.

In explaining his decision, Mr. O'Keefe had cited a recommendation of the
board that investigated the Columbia space shuttle disaster last year that
NASA must develop a way to inspect and repair damage to the shuttle's thermal
protection system.

While the National Aeronautics and Space Administration was committed to
developing this ability for missions to the International Space Station, which
could serve as a "safe haven" for the astronauts if the shuttle was damaged,
Mr. O'Keefe said it was too risky and expensive to develop an "autonomous"
inspection and repair capability for a single mission to the telescope.

The new reports challenge Mr. O'Keefe's conclusion, citing data and references

>from NASA documents in arguing that the administrator's statement "cannot be

supported."

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommendations and NASA's plans for
"return to flight" include ultimately developing just such an ability to
inspect and repair the tiles independently of the station. That autonomous
ability is needed because the shuttle might fail to make it to the space
station, or the space station may become too big and complex to serve as a
repair base, according to the papers.

One of the reports concludes that missions to the telescope "are as safe as or
perhaps safer than" space station missions "conducted in the same time frame."

The author is a NASA engineer who wrote the reports based on internal data and
who declined to be identified for fear of losing his job. Copies of the
documents were provided to The New York Times by an astronomer who is not part
of NASA and opposes the decision to let the telescope die.

"Those documents certainly undercut the public position of the agency," said
Dr. Garth Illingworth, an astronomer at the University of California at Santa
Cruz and a member of a committee that advises NASA on space science.

Dr. Illingworth added that it was important to open up debate on these issues.
"We need to get real information out there, and not just have a few people in
NASA saying we know what's best," he said.

A Congressional staff member who was given the documents said they appeared to
be credible. "We are taking them seriously," he said. Referring to the
requirement of an autonomous repair capability, he said, "NASA's going to have
to spend the money to do this" if the agency follows the accident board's
recommendations.

The documents also argue that missions to the space station might actually be
riskier than going to the space telescope for several reasons. Because of the
space station's orbit in relation to the equator, the shuttle has to use more
energy, increasing the chances that something will go wrong and that it will
not make it into orbit. Moreover, one of the biggest dangers to the shuttle's
skin is micrometeorite impacts while it is in orbit. When it is at the
telescope, unlike when it is docked to the station, the shuttle can orient
itself backwards in its orbit, protecting its leading surfaces from such
impacts.

As for a safe haven, that could be met by launching the Hubble mission just
before a planned station mission, the report says. If there was trouble, a
second shuttle could be dispatched to rescue the crew. Using an airlock
system, astronauts could move from one shuttle to the other without going
outside.

The debate about the Hubble's demise is the latest chapter in the turbulent
history of the space telescope, which was launched in 1990 with a flawed
mirror and repaired by spacewalking astronauts. Floating above the murky
atmosphere, which blocks some infrared and ultraviolet light from reaching the
Earth, the telescope has provided views with unmatched clarity.

Last week, in response to meetings with Senator Barbara A. Mikulksi, Democrat
of Maryland, where the Space Telescope Science Institute and the Goddard Space
Flight Center are located, Mr. O'Keefe agreed to have his decision reviewed by
Adm. Harold W. Gehman Jr., who was chairman of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board.

Efforts to reach Admiral Gehman and Mr. O'Keefe were unsuccessful. A NASA
spokesman issued a statement saying that the administrator would await Admiral
Gehman's review, adding, "At the end of the day, however, the NASA
administrator cannot delegate his ultimate responsibility for decisions
related to the safety of human spaceflight."

Dr. Douglas D. Osheroff, a physicist at Stanford and a member of the accident
investigation board, said he agreed there was not much difference in the risks
for Hubble- versus station-bound missions.

Asked about the board's deliberations, he emphasized that he was speaking for
himself and not the whole board, which disbanded last September, and said in
an e-mail message, "I think we may have mentioned Hubble, but do not think it
was our intention of making it impossible for NASA to service Hubble."

Other space experts said that the reports appeared to be credible and
authoritative. Capt. Bruce C. McCandless, an astronaut who flew on the shuttle
in the 1980's and is now with the Lockheed Martin Corporation, said they
appeared to be "well researched and written."

He said that the catch regarding the autonomous repair capability was the word
"ultimately" in the accident investigation board's report. The canceled
mission had been 11th on the post-Columbia schedule. "Sooo, if "ultimate"
means in the first 10 missions," he said in an e-mail message, the service
mission would be covered.
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