On Aug 7, 6:02 am, Hiroshima Facts <hiroshima_fa...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Aug 6, 1:26 am, "Sir Arthur C.B.E. Wholeflaffers A.S.A."
<scie...@zzz.com> wrote:
Why World War II ended with Mushroom Clouds - 65 years ago, August 6
and 9, 1945: Hiroshima and Nagasaki
“On Monday, August 6, 1945, at 8:15 AM, the nuclear bomb ‘Little Boy”
was dropped on Hiroshima by an American B-29 bomber, the Enola Gay,
directly killing an estimated 80,000 people. By the end of the year,
injury and radiation brought total casualties to 90,000-140,000.”[1]
“On August 9, 1945, Nagasaki was the target of the world's second
atomic bomb attack at 11:02 a.m., when the north of the city was
destroyed and an estimated 40,000 people were killed by the bomb
nicknamed ‘Fat Man.’ The death toll from the atomic bombing totalled
73,884, as well as another 74,909 injured, and another several hundred
thousand diseased and dying due to fallout and other illness caused by
radiation.”
Nope. The dead from the radiation were counted in the 140,000 from
Hiroshima and the 80,000 from Nagasaki.
There was no several hundred thousand "additional" dead.
As the country that had made the biggest contribution and suffered by
far the greatest losses in the conflict against the common Nazi enemy,
the Soviet Union wanted major reparation payments from Germany and
security against potential future aggression, in the form of the
installation in Germany, Poland and other Eastern European countries
of governments that would not be hostile to the Soviets, as had been
the case before the war.
Translation: they wanted to crush democracy in Poland and set up a
puppet dictatorship, and they wanted to abuse Germany to the point
where they would again rise up and make war on Europe.
In the meantime the Japanese battled on in the Far East, even though
their situation was totally hopeless. They were in fact prepared to
surrender, but they insisted on a condition, namely, that Emperor
Hirohito would be guaranteed immunity. This contravened the American
demand for an unconditional capitulation. In spite of this it should
have been possible to end the war on the basis of the Japanese
proposal.
Unfortunately, the supposed Japanese proposal didn't exist at the
time.
Japan made that proposal only after both A-bombs had been dropped.
Moreover, the proposal did not ask for immunity for Hirohito. The
proposal wanted a guarantee that Hirohito would retain unlimited
dictatorial power as Japan's living deity.
The proposal was not at all acceptable, and when Japan finally did
make it, our reply was that Hirohito would be subordinate to
MacArthur.
The Japanese believed that they could still afford the luxury of
attaching a condition to their offer to surrender because the main
force of their land army remained intact, in China, where it had spent
most of the war. Tokyo thought that it could use this army to defend
Japan itself and thus make the Americans pay a high price for their
admittedly inevitable final victory, but this scheme would only work
if the Soviet Union stayed out of the war in the Far East; a Soviet
entry into the war, on the other hand, would inevitably pin down the
Japanese forces on the Chinese mainland. Soviet neutrality, in other
words, permitted Tokyo a small measure of hope; not hope for a
victory, of course, but hope for American acceptance of their
condition concerning the emperor. To a certain extent the war with
Japan dragged on, then, because the Soviet Union was not yet involved
in it. Already at the Conference of the Big Three in Tehran in 1943,
Stalin had promised to declare war on Japan within three months after
the capitulation of Germany, and he had reiterated this commitment as
recently as July 17, 1945, in Potsdam. Consequently, Washington
counted on a Soviet attack on Japan by the middle of August and thus
knew only too well that the situation of the Japanese was hopeless.
(“Fini Japs when that comes about,” Truman confided to his diary,
referring to the expected Soviet entry into the war in the Far East.)
[9] In addition, the American navy assured Washington that it was able
to prevent the Japanese from transferring their army from China in
order to defend the homeland against an American invasion. Since the
US navy was undoubtedly able to force Japan to its knees by means of a
blockade, an invasion was not even necessary. Deprived of imported
necessities such as food and fuel, Japan could be expected to beg to
capitulate unconditionally sooner or later.
Actually, the US had no idea whatsoever what would make Japan
capitulate.
All we knew when the bombs were dropped was that so far they were
refusing to surrender.
In order to finish the war against Japan, Truman thus had a number of
very attractive options. He could accept the trivial Japanese
condition with regard to immunity for their emperor;
No, he couldn't. First, the condition was hardly as trivial as
suggested. And second, the condition was not even offered until after
both A-bombs had already been dropped.
he could also
wait until the Red Army attacked the Japanese in China, thus forcing
Tokyo into accepting an unconditional surrender after all;
Truman was definitely hoping the Soviet attack on Japanese forces
would help push them towards surrender, but it was hardly the case
that he had any reason to believe that this alone would make Japan
surrender.
or he could
starve Japan to death by means of a naval blockade that would have
forced Tokyo to sue for peace sooner or later.
As if we could afford to wait?
Is the forced starvation of millions of Japanese civilians being
offered as morally superior to killing a couple hundred thousand with
the A-bombs?
Truman and his
advisors, however, chose none of these options; instead, they decided
to knock Japan out with the atomic bomb.
Wrong again. Truman chose all of those options (well, except for
Japan's preposterous surrender offer which they only made after the
bombs).
Truman encouraged the Soviets to attack. Truman gave the go ahead for
the bombs. And Truman had the blockade push ahead full throttle (had
the war continued even a few months longer the blockade would have
caused the starvation deaths of 10 million Japanese civilians).
Truman also had planning for the bloody invasion of Japan go forward,
because he did not know if any of those other measures would have
caused Japan to surrender.
This fateful decision, which
was to cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, mostly women
and children, offered the Americans considerable advantages. First,
the bomb might force Tokyo to surrender before the Soviets got
involved in the war in Asia, thus making it unnecessary to allow
Moscow a say in the coming decisions about postwar Japan, about the
territories which had been occupied by Japan (such as Korea and
Manchuria), and about the Far East and the Pacific region in general.
The USA would then enjoy a total hegemony over that part of the world,
something which may be said to have been the true (though unspoken)
war aim of Washington in the conflict with Japan. It was in light of
this consideration that the strategy of simply blockading Japan into
surrender was rejected, since the surrender might not have been
forthcoming until after – and possibly well after - the Soviet Union’s
entry into the war.
The blockade was not rejected. It was going ahead full throttle.
As far as the American leaders were concerned, a Soviet intervention
in the war in the Far East threatened to achieve for the Soviets the
same advantage which the Yankees’ relatively late intervention in the
war in Europe had produced for the United States, namely, a place at
the round table of the victors who would force their will on the
defeated enemy, carve occupation zones out of his territory, change
borders, determine postwar social-economic and political structures,
and thereby derive for themselves enormous benefits and prestige.
Washington absolutely did not want the Soviet Union to enjoy this kind
of input.
Well, they had just witnessed the Soviets crush democracy in Poland.
No one in their right mind wanted the Soviets to have any say in
anything.
However, if it came to the point where we would have to invade Japan,
we still wanted Soviet involvement.
Use of the atom bomb offered Washington a second important
advantage. Truman’s experience in Potsdam had persuaded him that only
an actual demonstration of this new weapon would make Stalin
sufficiently pliable. Nuking a “Jap” city, preferably a “virgin” city,
where the damage would be especially impressive, thus loomed useful as
a means to intimidate the Soviets and induce them to make concessions
with respect to Germany, Poland, and the rest of Central and Eastern
Europe.
It is very unlikely that Truman thought something that absurd. He did
hope the bombs' existence would make the Soviets start behaving like
humans, but the use on Japan had nothing to do with that.
The atomic bomb was ready just before the Soviets became involved in
the Far East. Even so, the nuclear pulverization of Hiroshima on
August 6, 1945, came too late to prevent the Soviets from entering the
war against Japan. Tokyo did not throw in the towel immediately, as
the Americans had hoped, and on August 8, 1945 - exactly three months
after the German capitulation in Berlin - the Soviets declared war on
Japan. The next day, on August 9, the Red Army attacked the Japanese
troops stationed in northern China. Washington itself had long asked
for Soviet intervention, but when that intervention finally came,
Truman and his advisors were far from ecstatic about the fact that
Stalin had kept his word.
Actually, Truman and his advisors were extremely ecstatic. They were
absolutely delighted that the Soviets had joined the war.
If Japan’s rulers did not respond
immediately to the bombing of Hiroshima with an unconditional
capitulation, it may have been because they could not ascertain
immediately that only one plane and one bomb had done so much damage.
No, that wasn't it.
By August 7, they knew for a fact that the entire city had been
destroyed by a single bomb, and they knew that we had claimed it was
an atomic bomb.
They also knew what an atomic bomb was, because they had their own A-
bomb program. They were nowhere near producing an A-bomb of their
own, but they knew very well what one was.
In any event, it took some time before
an unconditional capitulation was forthcoming, and on account of this
delay the USSR did get involved in the war against Japan after all.
This made Washington extremely impatient: the day after the Soviet
declaration of war, on August 9, 1945, a second bomb was dropped, this
time on the city of Nagasaki. A former American army chaplain later
stated: “I am of the opinion that this was one of the reasons why a
second bomb was dropped: because there was a rush. They wanted to get
the Japanese to capitulate before the Russians showed up.”[11]
That was an extremely ignorant chaplain.
There was no "rush" for the second A-bomb. The military had been
ordered to drop each A-bomb as it became ready for use, and the next
one was ready for use.
And it actually took some time before even a conditional surrender was
forthcoming, as Japan did not even attempt a conditional surrender
until after Nagasaki. The unconditional surrender was even further
off.
Sixty-five years ago, Truman did not have to use the atomic bomb in
order to force Japan to its knees, but he had reasons to want to use
the bomb.
Sixty-five years ago, Truman did not know what it would take to make
Japan surrender. The best he could do is hit them with everything he
had, and hope that it was enough.
The atom bomb enabled the Americans to force Tokyo to
surrender unconditionally, to keep the Soviets out of the Far East and
- last but not least - to force Washington’s will on the Kremlin in
Europe also. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were obliterated for these
reasons, and many American historians realize this only too well;
Actually, the historians realize that the reason Truman dropped the
bombs was the hope that they would finally make Japan surrender --
something Japan had steadfastly refused to do up to that point.
Sean Dennis Cashman, for example, writes:
With the passing of time, many historians have concluded that the bomb
was used as much for political reasons...
No, virtually all the historians say the reason for the bombs was to
make Japan surrender.
Secretary of State James
F. Byrnes [Truman’s Secretary of State] never denied a statement
attributed to him that the bomb had been used to demonstrate American
power to the Soviet Union in order to make it more manageable in
Europe.[13]
There is no question that they hoped the bombs would make the Soviets
start acting civilized.
But that does not mean that the bombs were dropped on Japan for any
reason other than Japanese surrender.
Truman himself, however, hypocritically declared at the time that the
purpose of the two nuclear bombardments had been “to bring the boys
home,” that is, to quickly finish the war without any further major
loss of life on the American side. This explanation was uncritically
broadcast in the American media and it developed into a myth eagerly
propagated by the majority of historians and media in the USA and
throughout the “Western” world. That myth, which, incidentally, also
serves to justify potential future nuclear strikes on targets such as
Iran and North Korea, is still very much alive - just check your
mainstream newspaper on August 6 and 9!
That is hardly a myth. And it was hardly hypocritical.
The invasion of Japan was projected to cost up to a million American
lives, and countless more injured.
The prospect of this invasion worried Truman greatly. That is why he
was still eager for the Soviets to help fight Japan despite the fact
that they were showing themselves to be troublemakers.
When Japan finally started offering to surrender, Truman was greatly
relieved.
I think you are distortin history a bit. The Soviets entered the war
against Japan for the sole purpose of a land grab. Noone of the
Allies wanted them in there. They knew Japan was beat it was only a
question of time once we had the bomb.
The Soviets ended up with all of Sakhalin plus the Premorskie Islands
(not sure if I have the right chain of islands though) and Japan is
still trying to it back.
Harry K