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From: "Steven J. Powell" <sjpowell@access.digex.net>
Date: Thu, 26 Dec 1996 20:44:06 -0500
Fwd Date: Fri, 27 Dec 1996 02:22:26 -0500
Subject: Eyewitness Testimony

The Eyewitness
Imperfect Interface
Between Stimuli and Story

James R. Reich, Jr.

(The Skeptical Inquirer, Vol. 17, No. 4, Summer 1993, Copyright 1993 by
the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the
Paranormal, 3965 Rensch Road, Buffalo, NY 14228, published quarterly
with a membership/subscription rate of $25/yr.)


        The eyewitness is a link between an event that has taken place
and the reporting of that event. In a real sense the memory of an
individual is put to the test when a detailed account of what took place
is desired. Eyewitnesses provide the support needed in our current legal
system. Without their testimony many cases could not proceed and due
process would become meaningless. Eyewitnesses' accounts are also the
thread with which the fabric of a seemingly paranormal or other
anomalous event is woven by the people who investigate or disseminate
such claims. It is important, then, to have some understanding of how
memory works and what might affect the recall of that memory after it
has been recorded.

        The study of how people recall events was initiated at the turn
of this century by the Harvard psychologist Hugo Munsterberg (1863-
1916). In his work he found that people tend to remember events as
slightly different from how they actually happened. One of his
experiments, conducted during a scientific meeting, involved an incident
in which a clown from a passing carnival rushed into the room followed
by a man with a revolver. There was an argument followed by a skirmish
and several shots, after which both individuals left. The stunned
audience was asked by the group leader, the only one there who had prior
knowledge of the experiment, to write down all they could remember about
what had just happened. Analysis of the information gathered showed that
only one individual out of the forty present was able to recall the
event with any accuracy. More than half of those present could manage no
better than a 60-percent recollection.

        Recent research includes work on leading questions. Richard J.
Harris (1973) asked questions using quantitative adjective or adverb
pairs, such as "old/new" and "tall/short." The subjects in his study
were divided into two groups. Each group was instructed to make as
accurate a guess as possible in answer to a series of questions. For
instance, one group was asked the question: "How tall was the basketball
player?" while the second group was asked "How short was the basketball
player?" Harris found that the group that was asked "how tall" estimated
the height at about 79 inches, while those who were asked "how short"
estimated the height at 69 inches. A full 10-inches - practically one
foot - difference!

        Using the same pattern in a different question, subjects were
asked about the height of an office building. The answers of those who
were asked "How high was the office building" averaged a height of 26
stories, while those who were asked "How low was the office building"
averaged only 13 stories - exactly one-half that of the first group.

        Other researchers have continued probing the leading-question
phenomenon. Elizabeth Loftus asked individuals questions about their
headaches and the products they used to treat them. The first set of
questions asked were (1) "In terms of the total number of products, how
many other products have you tried? One? Two? Three?" or (2) "In terms
of the total number of products, how many other products have you tried?
One? Five? Ten?" The responses to question 1 averaged 3.3 different
products, while the responses to question 2 averaged 5.2 different
products. The second key question asked was (1) "Do you get headaches
frequently, and, if so, how often?" or (2) "Do you get headaches
occasionally, and, if so, how often?" The "frequently" group reported an
average of 2.2 headaches a week, while the responses of the
"occasionally" group averaged 0.7 headaches a week.

        Loftus (1974) investigated the possible effects that leading
questions may have on memory. The key to her research centered around an
initial presupposition. For example, the question "How fast was the car
going when it ran the stop sign?" presupposes that there was a stop
sign. In reality, the stop sign may or may not have been there. If it
was there, Loftus suggests, then answering the question may strengthen
or enhance the experience by making more available certain key memory
representations corresponding to the stop sign. On the other hand, if
the stop sign was not there, Loftus speculated, then it may be treated
as new information that could surface at a later time, when the stop
sign could be remembered as actually having been there.

        Several experiments were conducted to see if this actually is
the case. In the first experiment two groups viewed a film of an auto
accident, after which they were to answer a ten-item questionnaire. The
film showed a car that, after failing to stop at a stop sign, made a
right turn. In order to avoid an accident the driver of a car in the
oncoming traffic hit the brakes, causing a five-car bumper-to-bumper
collision. A diagram was provided labeling the car that ran the stop
sign as car A and the cars involved in the collision as B through F. Two
key questions were asked. For one group the first question was "How fast
was car A going when it ran the stop sign?" The first question for the
other group was "How fast was car A going when it turned right?" the
second question, asked of both groups, was "Did you see a stop sign for
car A?" The results showed that 55 percent of those who were first asked
the "stop sign" question answered that they did see the stop sign, while
only 35 percent of those answering the "turned right" question answered
in the affirmative.

        Loftus developed two hypotheses to explain this effect. First,
when subjects are asked the initial "stop sign" question, this
reinforces their memory of the stop sign and they respond at a later
time with this reinforced representation. Loftus's second explanation,
called the construction hypothesis, suggests that subjects use the
presupposition in the initial "stop sign" question to reconstruct in
their memories the existence of the stop sign. The importance of the
construction hypothesis is that any type of information can subsequently
be introduced into a person's memory using questions containing
presuppositions, whether the presuppositions are true or false.

        Loftus's second experiment was set up to determine whether the
construction hypothesis could be supported. In this experiment subjects
viewed a 3-minute videotape excerpt showing a disruption in a classroom
by eight demonstrators. After the video was shown, a questionnaire with
20 questions was distributed. The subjects were divided into two groups.
Nineteen of the questions were similar. The one key question that
differed was either (1) "Was the leader of the 4 demonstrators who
entered the classroom a male?" or (2) "Was the leader of the 12
demonstrators who entered the classroom a male?" After a week the
subjects were asked a new set of 20 questions with the key question for
all being "How many demonstrators did you see entering the classroom?"
Those who had answered the question counting the number of demonstrators
as 12 thought they remembered an average of 8.5 in the video. While the
group who had answered the question referring to 4 demonstrators
recalled an average of 6.40. This experiment demonstrated that false
numerical data can have an effect on an individual's memory. Loftus next
wanted to find out if the same results could be seen when the false
presupposition concerned something that didn't exist.

        In this experiment subjects viewed a short videotape of an
automobile accident and then answered ten questions based on the
accident. The subjects were divided into two groups. One group was asked
the key question "How fast was the white sports car going when it passed
the barn while traveling along the country road?" and the other group
had the question "How fast was the white sports car going while
traveling along the country road?" In fact, there was no barn in the
video. One week later the subjects returned and answered ten questions
about the accident, the key question for everyone being "Did you see a
barn!" Of those subjects earlier exposed to the false presupposition
that there was a barn 17.3 percent responded that they had seen a barn.
Only 2.7 percent of those who did not have the presupposition in the
original question responded that they had seen a barn.

        To explain this, Loftus described a theory of memory for complex
visual experiences. In this theory there are two main processes. The
first deals with the acquisition of data, and the second delves into the
retrieval of that data. The acquisition can further be divided into two
components. The first is the acquisition of the original experience.
Clearly not everything that happens to us can be stored in our memory.
The mind separates what is and is not to be stored by the amount of
attention we give a particular object. If we go for a walk across a
field, chances are we will let our minds wander a bit. Soon we find that
we have covered a lot of ground. Immediately we wonder how we got where
we are. Since we haven't focused our attention on the walk, nothing is
remembered. The same kind of thing can happen when we are reading. How
many times have you read a paragraph only to discover you have no idea
what you have read? In order to acquire a particular memory we must
concentrate on what it is we want to store. Once our attention is
focused, the mind transforms the information into some form or
representation that can be stored in the brain. This newly acquired
information is not carved in granite by any means. It is subject to
future alterations by a mixing of the actual event with subsequent or
even prior information. This illustrates the second component of the
acquisition process, the acquisition of additional information. It is at
this step where leading questions enter into the picture and are able to
distort the true representation stored in memory.

        The retrieval process will come into play at any time after the
initial experience. Each time the event is brought into conscious
thought there is a possibility of altering the original memory. The
farther removed from the event, the greater the chance of an imperfect
or distorted recollection.

        Recently, researchers have added to the understanding of why
leading questions affect those who encounter them. Smith and Ellsworth
(1987) indicate that the uncertainty surrounding the memory of an event
is an important antecedent for the effectiveness of being misled. A
clear memory is less susceptible to being fooled by leading questions.
Memories of tangential details are more prone to alteration when leading
questions are used than are more important details.

        Smith and Ellsworth also found that subjects accept leading
questions more readily from those they think are more knowledgeable
about the event or situation than they themselves are. For example, if a
person witnesses some type of crime and the crime is severe enough, say
an armed robbery, he or she will experience a lot of stress. Stress
usually lessens the witnesses' ability to perceive the event (Clifford
and Scott 1978; Loftus 1980). Later, when the police are trying to find
out what has happened, they may ask questions that a witness feels he
should know the answers to even if he doesn't: "About what time was it
when the robbery took place?" "What type of clothing was the perpetrator
wearing?" "Was he tall? Short? Fat? Thin?"

        If the witness is at all hesitant, the officer may probe with
more specific questions, and the witness may be intimidated to answer
using the clues that the officer is unintentionally giving.

        Officer: "Did it happen in the morning?"
        Witness: "I'm not sure, but I believe so - yes, it did take
place in the morning."
        Officer: "Was he wearing a red long sleeved shirt?"
        Witness: "Yes, it was long sleeved. I don't remember the color."
        And so on.

        When one is interviewing a witness to an event, it is best to
present oneself as being as much in the dark about it as the witness.

        Another area of investigation concerning eyewitness testimony is
the apparent relationship between the accuracy of a witness's testimony
and his or her overall confidence. Studies have indicated that nearly 40
percent of defense attorneys agree that there is a positive correlation
between the accuracy and confidence of the witness. Although it was
found in one study (Kassin 1985) that accurate responses were made
somewhat more quickly than inaccurate responses, confident responses
were made much more quickly than unsure replies. In other words, the
less time it takes to reply, the greater the amount of confidence that
can be attributed to the witness. But is this a valid assumption?
Further experiments (Smith, Kassin, and Ellsworth 1989) have shown that
there is little to suggest that confidence is a good predictor of
accuracy, and relying on such a correlation may actually be misleading.

        For serious investigations into seemingly paranormal or other
anomalous events, it would appear that the investigator should follow a
few simple guidelines. First, he or she should determine how many other
investigators have already had contact with the individual in question.
If the number is high, there is a good chance that the original memory
of the event has evolved into something a little different. This would
only be natural and should actually be expected in most cases. The
second guideline is that investigators should interact with witnesses in
such a way that they are not intimidating. They should not be guilty of
"tampering with the evidence," the "evidence" being the memory of the
reporting individual. Lastly, the investigator should not be influenced
by the apparent speed or lack of speed with which the individual replies
to a question. A quick reply does not necessarily assure that it is an
accurate or truthful answer, nor does a hesitant response mean it is an
inaccurate answer. It's up to the investigator to use good judgment when
conducting an interview. This may result in shedding new light on many
paranormal claims.

References

Clifford, Brian R., and Jane Scott. 1978.
    Individual and situational factors in
    eyewitness testimony. Journal of Applied
    Psychology, 63(3): 352-359.
Harris, R. J. 1973, Answering questions
    containing marked and unmarked adjec-
    tives and adverbs. Journal of experimental
    Psychology, 88:216-222.
Kassin, Saul M. 1985. Eyewitness identifi-
     cation: Retrospective self-awareness and
     the accuracy-confidence correlation.
     Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
     49(4): 878-893.
Loftus, Elizabeth F. 1975. Leading questions
     and the eyewitness report. Cognitive
     Psychology, No. 7:560-572.
 ____. 1980. Memory: Surprising New In-
     sights into How We Remember and Why
     We Forget. Reading, Mass.: Addison-
     Wesley.
Smith, Vicky L., Saul M. Kassin, and Phoebe
     C. Elsworth. 1989. Eyewitness accuracy
     vs. confidence: Within versus between
     subjects correlations. Journal of Applied
     Psychology, 74(2): 356-359.
Smith, Vicky L., and Phoebe C. Ellsworth.
     1987. The social psychology of eyewit-
     ness accuracy: Misleading questions and
     communicator expertise. Journal of App-
     lied Psychology, 72(2): 294-300.

James R. Reich, Jr., is with the Office of the Medical Examiner, Cook
County, Illinois, and is interested in the psychology of reports of
anomalous phenomena. Address: 7823 Westwood Dr., Elmwood Park, IL 60635.


--

Thanks, take care.
John.

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