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From: BOB SHELL <76750.2717@CompuServe.COM>
Date: 15 Jan 97 09:14:55 EST
Fwd Date: Thu, 16 Jan 1997 01:17:21 -0500
Subject: Corso - Some Background

Errol,

You probably already have these documents, but just in case no one sent them to
you I am forwarding them.  The first one speaks eloquently as to exactly who
Corso is, the second is "interesting"

File Number One

>>>>>
       National Security Committee - Military Personnel Subcommittee

                STATEMENT of - COLONEL {ret.} PHILLIP CORSO
     Hearing on POW/MIA Accountability - House Subcommittee on Military
                       Personnel - September 17, 1996

* During the Korean War, I was Head of the Special Projects
Branch/Intelligence Division/Far East Command. General Douglas MacArthur
was in command. I stayed and served in the same position under General
Ridgwar and General Clark. My duties included the production of
Intelligence on political (counter-insurgency), and subversive activities
by the enemy in both North and South Korea. Within this framework I was
responsible for intelligence and communist activities (North Korea, Chinese
and Soviet) within our prisoner of war camps in South Korea and the enemy
camps in North Korea. In 1953, I was a staff member of the truce delegation
at Panmunjom and participated in the discussion for the exchange of sick
and wounded prisoners. I was on the ground and met and talked with our
returning sick and wounded.

During the course of my duties, I discovered that the entire operation on
the treatment and handling of our prisoners of war was supervised,
masterminded and controlled by the Soviet Union, as was the entire
operation of the war and hostilities in Korea. I wrote a study on how this
control extended into our POW camps holding North Koreans and Chinese in
South Korea, nominally in our control. I titled the study, "WAR IN THE POW
CAMPS." Soviet policy, conveyed to their allies, was that a soldier taken
prisoner is still at war and a combatant. They trained soldiers to be taken
as prisoner and then agitate in the camps to keep the POWs in our custory
under their control.

The brainwashing and atrocities against American prisoners were conscious
acts of Soviet policy. Not only was it used on our prisoners, but on their
own people and others under their control. The basis for their action was
the Pavlovian theory of conditioned reflexes.

I had information on medical experiments (Nazi style) on our prisoners. The
most devilish and cunning was the techniques of mind altering (Pavlov). It
was just as deadly as brain surgery and many U.S. POWs died under such
treatment. This was told to me by our own returning POWs. Many POWs willed
themselves to death.

My findings revealed that the Soviets taught their allies, the Chinese
Communists and North Koreans, a detailed scientific process aimed at
molding prisoners of war into forms in which they could be exploited.
Returned prisoners who underwent the experience reported the experts
assigned to mold them were highly trained, efficient and well educated.
They were specialists in applying a deadly psychological treatment which
often ended in physical torment. The Soviet approach was a deliberate act
of their overall policy which actively rejects, subverts and destroys
decent standards of conduct and the whole structure of human values.

Upon my return to the United States, I was assigned to the Operations
Coordinating Board (OCB) of the White House, National Security Council, and
handled virtually all projects to U.S. prisoners of war. Here I found out
that U.S. policy forbade that we win in Korea. The policy amounted to an
actual paralysis and diversion of activity to force the return of our
prisoners in enemy hands, including those in the Soviet Union.

Years later, I discussed this situation with Attorney General Robert
Kennedy in his office and he agreed with me. This "NO WIN" policy is
contained in policy directives NSC-68, NSC-68/2 and NSC-135/3. The basis
for this policy was in directives ORE-750, NIE 2, 2/1, 2/2, 10 and 11. We
called this the "FIG LEAF POLICY."

Note: Recently, the CIA in news releases admitted their NIE (National
Intelligence Estimates) were wrong or not accurate.

In the past I have tried to tell Congress the fact that in 1953, 500 sick
and wounded American prisoners were within ten miles of the prisoner
exchange point at Panmunjom but were never exchanged. (Subsequent
information indicated that they all died afterwards.)

Although I prepared a statement that was made at the Panmunjom delegation
table, I was not asked even one question regarding this event.

During my tour of duty as the chief of the Special Projects Section of the
Intelligence Division of the Far East Command, I received numerous reports
that American POWs has been sent to the Soviet Union. These reports were
from many sources: Chinese and North Korean POWs, agent reports,
Nationalist Chinese reports, our guerrillas, NSA intercepts, defectors and
from our own returning POWs.

My intelligence centered around three train loads of 450 POWs each. Two of
these trainloads were confirmed over and over, the third was not as
certain. Therefore, the final figure was, "confirmed 900, and 1,200
possibly. " These were the figures that I discovered with President
Eisenhower while I was a member of his NSC.

The bulk of the sightings were at Manchu-Ii, on the border of Manchuria and
the USSR. Here the rail gauge changed and the U.S. POWs had to be
transferred across a platform to a waiting train going into the Soviet
Union.

These POWs were to be exploited for intelligence purposes and subsequently
eliminated. The methods of exploitation were not only practiced on our
POWs, but all others falling into COMMUNIST hands.

To the skeptics and debunkers, I have only this to say: By some flashback
in time, I wish you could be present with me at the prisoner exchanges in
Korea in 1953 and look into the faces of those sick and wounded prisoners
--- Americans and allied soldiers --- as they came across in the exchange.
If you had witnessed their sacrifices and what they had suffered by
COMMUNIST hands, you would not be a critic or skeptic today.

I will close with this final remembrance. At Panmunjom, as a wounded
Turkish soldier was exchanged, he peeled off the Chinese padded clothing
and flung them at the nearest COMMUNIST guard. I asked the Turkish Captain
standing with me, "What did he say?" He answered, "Till we meet again."
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
File Number Two

Thursday January 2 11:33 PM EST

CIA Unveils New Plan to Open Up Secrets

WASHINGTON (Reuter) - The Central Intelligence Agency said Thursday it had
begun a declassification review of two vast bodies of documents that could
shed new light on the Cold War and may open up many secrets.

The reviews involve all records that flowed in and out of the office of the
director of central intelligence for the past 50 years, as well as all CIA
studies on the former Soviet Union from the spy agency's inception in 1947.

The twin initiatives were being carried out by the CIA's Center for the
Study of Intelligence, a kind of in-house think tank, at the urging of the
director of central intelligence's historical review panel of outside
historians, CIA spokesman David Christian said.

The CIA declined to cite a target for making public the eligible parts of
this material, but said its long-delayed release of files from another
major declassification project -- involving 11 key Cold War covert actions
-- would begin in a matter of weeks, "subject to final review by senior
officials."

The first of the declassified covert actions would concern the 1954 coup
that overthrew Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, the elected president of Guatemala,
Christian said. He said these documents were "on the verge of release."

He said that could be followed within weeks by release of records on the
failed 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. Next up would be files on the
1953 coup that installed the late Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in Iran,
Christian said.

But alluding to chronic problems in meeting its own timetable for making
such material public, the CIA spokesman declined to name a target for
release of the Iran records or any of the other Cold War covert actions.

Christian said the CIA's plans to declassify its covert actions, first
promised in 1992 by then-CIA Director Robert Gates, had been set back two
years by the 1992 John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Law under which the
CIA made public more than 200,000 pages of records.

The declassification review of the files of the 17 men who have served as
the nation's top spymaster would stretch back to 1946, when the office of
director of central intelligence was created to manage the transition from
the wartime Office of Strategic Services to the CIA.

Although not all reviewed material would necessarily be made public because
of the need to protect intelligence sources and methods, the review would
involve things like telephone logs, appointment books, memos written by the
directors, and memos that they received, Christian said.

"This could be very interesting," he added.

The CIA studies on the former Soviet Union that are under declassification
review are distinct from "national intelligence estimates" on the same
subject, which are the work of the entire intelligence community. More than
450 of these have already been released in recent years.

Among the other Cold War actions due for declassification review are
activities in support of democracy in France and Italy in the 1940s and
1950s, insurgencies in Indonesia and Tibet in the 1950s and 1960s, secret
operations against North Korea during the Korean War and against Communist
forces in Laos during the Vietnam War.

John Lewis Gaddis, a leading Cold War historian who is a former member of
the historical review panel, said he would not be satisfied with the CIA's
declassification effort until he saw what they actually turned over to the
National Archives, the independent agency that catalogues government
documents.

"The proof is going to be in the pudding," he said in a telephone interview
from Ohio University in Athens, Ohio. "The real issue is when are actual
documents going to show up at the National Archives, as opposed to the
CIA's own highly selective publications of historical materials ... What a
historian wants is to see the archives."<<<<<<<



Sorry for not having a > in front of every line, but the only way I can do that
with my software is to manually insert each one, and I just don't have the time.

Bob